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448 MONTEREY PENIN. AIRPORT DIST. v. MASON. [19 C. (2d) 
accomplish certain objectives necessary for the protection of 
the public health, safety and morals, the legislature may enact 
more specific legislation dealing with the subject without vio-
lating the constitutional inhibition aimed at special legisla-
tion. This was recognized in the case of American River 
Flood Oontrol District v. Sweet, 214 Cal. 778 [7 Pac. (2d) 
1030], which presented a situation and problem analogous to 
those here presented. The cited CMe points out that· the Ven-
tura case, supra, relied on here by respondent, recognizes 
"that special legislation might coexist with a general law on 
the subject, and that it would be deemed a valid exerGiseof 
legislative power untIl it is demonstrated that a general law 
could be made applicable." It also points out, which is also 
significant here, that "the general law is permissive only. The 
initiation of proceedings for the formation of such districts 
under general law must depend on the voluntary petition of 
land owners in the district. The land owners in the district 
might never file, or might indefinitely delay the filing of, such 
a petition. Here the district is created by the special act. It 
has no alternative but to function and carry out the purposes 
of the act. The act contemplates the safeguards of life.and 
property .... The project contemplated by the act is one of 
the essential parts of the co-ordinated plan .... The federal 
act made certain appropriations in aid of the plan provide9 
for by the act here in question, conditioned ... on assur-
ances that appropriations would be made by the State of Cali~ 
fornia .... " 
The facts of the present case are even more compelling than 
those of the cited case. Here, the legislature in providing for 
the protection of alarge and populous area has createdapu,b-
lic corporation to execute an important unit of the natiol1.al· 
defense plan. The accomplishment of this project presents a 
problem unlike any other existing in the state and the ill;,:t-
chinery of the general law is inadequate to accomplish the 
objective. The legislature, in its wisdom, has determined tha.t 
a solution of the problem lies only in the creation of a sepa-
rate and special entity. It is not our province to interfere 
with that determination. 
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue as prayed, and pur-
suant to stipulation of the parties., here filed, waiving t4e 
statutory time within which such writ may issue, it is further 
ordered that such peremptory writ may issue upon the filirig 
of this decision. ' 
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BEN BARD, as Special Administrator, etc., Respondent, v. 
L.E. KENT, Individually and as Director, etc., Appel-
lants. 
[1] Contracts - Consent - Continuing Offer or "Option" - As 
Affected by Consideration.-An option is an offer which is re-
voked by the death of the offeror prior to acceptance if it is 
without consideration, but is a contract binding upon him and 
his Successors in interest after his death if a consideration is 
given. (See Civ. Code, § 1587, subd. 4.) 
ld.-Consideration ~ Sufficiency - Agreement of Offeror.-
If the· holder of an option to extend a lease pays the archi-
tect's fee for sketches of proposed improvements on the de-
mised premises, there is a consideration sufficient to make the 
option irre.vocable, provided the offeror agrees t.o accept it as 
su.ch~ However, no act of an offeree can constitute a considera-
tion binding upon the offeror unless the latter agrees to be 
bound in return therefor. 
[3] Cancellation-Actions-Evidence-Weight and Su:ffi.ciency-
Consideration for Option.-Inan action to cancel an option to 
extend a lease, the evidence justified the trial court in conclud-
ing that the optionor did not promise to. grant the option in 
return for the engaging of an architect to draw plans for 
proposed improvements on the demised premises, where it 
showed merely that the optionor stated the conditions under 
which she was willing to extend the lease and that she sug-
gested the engaging of an architect. 
Estoppel - Equitable Estoppel - Promissory Estoppel.-To 
render applicable the doctrine of promissory ·estoppel by vir-
. trie of which a promisor who has received no considel ation is 
nevertheless bound by his promise when he has indu0ed an-
.. other to suffer detriment in reliance thereon, there must be .:t 
promise on which reliance may be based. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
wngeles County. Roy V. Rhodes, JUdge. Affirmed. 
See 6 Cal. Jur. 48-53. 
See 6 Cal: Jur. 168, 169. 
:. Dig.' References: [1] Contracts, §§ 17, 18; [2] Contracts,. 
,[31 Cancellation,§ 76; [4] Estoppel, §20. 
19 O. (2d)·-15 
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Action to cancel an option to extend a lease. Judgment for 
plaintiff affirmed. 
Bautzer & Ryan, Gregson Bautzer, G. Bentley Ryan, Perry 
Bertram and Bertin Weyl, Jr., for Appellants. 
Paul Vallee and Jerome H. Kann for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-The defendant in this action, L. E. Kent, 
administered the business affairs of Mrs. Ruth Roland Bard, 
hereinafter referred to as Miss Roland, under a general power 
of attorney for many years before .her death. In 1933, Kent, 
acting as agent for Miss Roland, leased for five years a parcel 
of real property owned by her to Cliff Odums and Albert 
M. Berkson, who constructed a building on the property and 
installed equipment for the operation of a restaurant named 
the Cat and the Fiddle. The restaurant failed, and Odums and 
Berkson abandoned the venture. Thereupon Kent, acting in 
his personal capacity, together with Howard Hastings and 
Don Carpenter, organized a corporation, known as the Cat 
and the Fiddle Company, which assumed the obligations of 
Odums and Berkson and took over the operation of the res-
taurant. When this venture likewise proved unprofitable, 
Kent bought the stock of· Hastings and Carpenter in the Cat 
and the Fiddle Company and continued to payoff the obliga-
tions that the company had assumed. Various sublessees who 
thereafter tried to operate a restaurant on the premises were 
unsuccessful. 
On August 21, 1935, Miss Roland executed a lease of the 
premises to the Cat and the Fiddle Company for a term of 
five years. The lessee subsequently obtained an extension of 
the lease and written authority to sublease the premises to 
M. A. McDonnell. On August 30, 1935, the premises were 
subleased to :McDonnell for a term of five years ending 
August 31, 1940, with an· option to renew the lease for one 
year. This lease from the Cat and the Fiddle Company to 
McDonnell included the right to use the equipment and fix-
tures on the premises and provided for rental payments of 
10% of the gross receipts up to $6,000 and 8% of the gross 
receipts. over that amount, with a minimum payment of $450 
per month. The restaurant operated by McDonnell proved 
highly successful, and he made improvements costing approx-
imately $30,000. Meanwhile Kent dissolved the corporation, 
Feb. 1942.] BARD v. KENT. 
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distributed its assets to himself, and continued· his business 
as an individual under the fictitious name of the Cat and the 
Fiddle Company. As owner of the improvements upOn the 
property he received half of the rent, but upon termination 
of the lease the improvements were to revert to Miss Roland. 
During 1936 McDonnell told Miss Roland and Kent that 
he would undertake additional improvements at a cost of 
about $10,000 if his lease were extended for another four 
years. Miss Roland in subsequent conversations with Kent 
expressed a willingness to grant the extension if the pro-
posed improvements would cost approximately $10,000. She 
suggested that Kent check the figures and have an architect 
draw· sketches for the purpose of making an estimate. On 
August 17, 1937, Miss Roland executed to the Cat and the 
Fiddle Company an option to extend its lease for an addi-
tional four years in order that it in turn could give McDon-
nell an extension of his lease. The option was signed for 
Miss Roland by Kent as her attorney in fact. It recited that 
"For consideration of Ten Dollars ($10.00) and other valu-
able consideration" the Cat and the Fiddle Company was 
granted an option to extend its lease for an additional period 
of four years. After the option was signed, Kent instructed 
Kenneth McDonald, an architect, to draw sketches of the 
proposed improvements. These sketches were billed to Kent 
and paid for by him subsequent to the deaths of the archi-
tect and Miss Roland. 
On September· 22, 1937, before the option was exercised, 
Miss Roland died. The special administrator of her estate 
brought this action against Kent to cancel and set aside the 
option on the grounds that it Was not only given without 
consideration and therefol"e revoked by the death of the 
offeror, but that it was obtained by fraud. It was stipulated 
that the sum of $10 was not paid to Miss Roland and that 
none of the proposed improvements were made. The trial 
court found that defendant made a complete disclosure of 
all the transactions to Miss Roland and that he was not 
guilty of any fraud or wrongdoing in his dealings with her. 
The court also found, however, that there was no considera-
tion given for the· option and that it was therefore revoked 
by Miss Roland's death. Defendant has appealed from the 
judgment in favor of plaintiff. 
[1] An option is an offer and if it is without considera .. 
tion, it is revoked by the death of the offeror prior to accep-
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tance. If consideration is given, it is a contract binding upon 
the offeror and upon his successors in interest after his'death. 
(See case cited in 6 Cal. Jur., pp. 48-53, secs. 27, 28, 29; 
Williston, Contracts (revised ed.), secs. 61, 62; Cal. Civ. 
Code, sec. 1587 ( 4) .) Since the trial court found that no con-
sideration was given for the option in question, the judgment 
must be upheld if the finding is supported by sufficient· evi-
dence. [2] Defendant contends that his payment of the archi-
tect's fee for sketches of the proposed improvements is a 
consideration sufficient to make the option irrevocable. There 
is no doubt that such payment would be consideration for 
an option if the offeror agreed to accept it as such. (Marsh 
v. LoU, 8 Cal. App. 384 [97 Pac. 163] ; Chrisman v. Southern 
Calif. Edison Co., 83 Cal. App. 249 [256 Pac. 618] ; 6 Cal~ 
Jur. 168, 169, sec. 117; 1 Williston, Contracts (Revised ed.), 
secs. 102, 102a; Rest. Contracts, sec. 75; see Hemenway v. 
Abbott, 8 Cal. App. 450 [97 Pac. 190]:) No act of an offeree, 
however, can constitute consideration binding upon the offeror 
unless the latter agrees to be bound in return therefor. (W il.: 
Hams v. Hasshagen, 166 Cal. 386, 390 [137 Pac. 9J; Sha,d-
burne v. Daly, 76 Cal. 355, 359 [18 Pac. 403] ; Oommercial 
Bank v. Redfield, 122 Cal. 405, 409 [55 Pac. 160, 772] ; Tif-
fany & Co. v. Spreckels, 202 Cal. 778, 790 [262 Pac. 742J. 
See Williston, Contracts (revised ed.), sec. 61, at pp. 180, 
181, note 16; secs. 100, 102, 102a.) In the words of the 
Restatement of Contracts (sec. 75): "Consideration must 
actually be bargained for as the exchange for the promise. 
. . . The existence or non-existence of a bargain where some-
thing has been parted with by the promisee or received by 
the promisor. depends upon the manifested intention of the 
parties. . . . The fact that the promisee relies on the promise 
to his injury, or the promisor ,gains some advantage there-
from, does Dot establish consideration without the element of 
bargain or agreed exchange. " 
[3] In the present case the trial court was justified in 
concluding from the evidence that Miss Roland did not prom-
ise to grant the option in return for Kent's engaging the 
architect. Under this interpretation of the evidence' Miss 
Roland merely stated the . conditions under which she was 
willing to extend the lease. Although, according to Kent's 
testimony, she suggested engaging an architect to check the 
Feb. 1942.] BARD v. KENT. 
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figures on the proposed improvements, this suggestion did 
not constitute a promise by her to grant the option if that 
were done. Kent employed the architect to convince her that 
the necessary conditions existed, but she made no promise to 
extend the lease in the event they did". and remained free to 
withdraw her offer at any time before acceptance. Kent could 
have exercised the option as soon as it was executed, but he 
chose instead to wait rather than to undertake immediately 
the obligations incident to leasing the property for another 
four years. The engagement of the architect was to actuate 
Miss Roland to keep her offer open, but it did not. constitute 
consideration binding her to do so. At best the evidence cre-
ated a conflict for the trial court to resolve. (Estate o/Thom-
son, 165 Cal. 290 [131 Pac. 1045].) 
[4] Defendant contends that in engaging the architect 
he acted' in reliance upon the option given him by Miss Roland 
to extend the lease, and that under the doctrine of promis-
sory estoppel a promisor who has received no consideration 
is nevertheless bound by his promise when he has induced 
another to suffer detriment in reliance thereon. (See Rest. 
Contracts, sec. 90; 1 Williston, Contracts (revised ed.), sec. 
139.) There must, however, be a promise on which reliance 
may be based. (See Medberry v. Olcovich, 15 Cal. App. 
(2d) 263 [59 Pac. (2d) 551, 60 Pac. (2d) 2811; Lasar v. 
Johnson, 125 Cal. 549 [58 Pac. 161] ; University of Southern 
Calif. v. Bryson, 103 Cal. App. 39 [283 Pac. 949] ; Magee v. 
Magee, 174 Cal. 276 [162 Pac. 1023].) Defendant did not 
plead the issue of promissory estoppel at the trial, and there 
is nothing ,in the record to show that Miss Roland at any 
time promised to keep the option open or made any other 
promise on which defendant could rely. She merely made 
without consideration an offer, which was never accepted, to 
renew the lease. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Houser, 
J., and Carter, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied March 9, 
1942. 
